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AGAINST PRACTICE 
Anthony V. Alfieri* 
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW. By 
William M. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welsh Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. 
Shulman. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007. Pp. x, 225. $40. 
"[T]he challenge of professional preparation for the law [is] linking the in­
terests of educators with the needs of practitioners and the members of the 
public the profession is pledged to serve-in other words, participating in 
civic professionalism" (p. 4). 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal education is against practice. More than a half century after 
Jerome Frank's call for a clinical-lawyer school, 1 and nearly two decades 
after the MacCrate Commission's plea for professional development,2 many 
American law schools continue to privilege theory over practice in teaching, 
scholarship, and institutional mission. In teaching, law schools elevate for­
mal knowledge and case-dialogue pedagogy over practical judgment and 
policy analysis. In scholarship, law schools favor doctrinal synthesis and 
critique over field-based research on "law in action." And in mission, law 
schools promote a self-regarding vision of lawyer-guild professionalism, 
role differentiation, and dyadic adversarial conflict over civic professional­
ism, role integration, and community-based social justice. 
The animus of theory-centered traditions toward practice obscures the 
interdisciplinary breadth, empirical richness, and moral import of lawyer 
roles and relationships. The same animus reduces professionalism to a 
largely aspirational function sounded in tropes to alumni, students, and the 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of Mi-
ami School of Law. For their comments and support, I am grateful to Mario Barnes, Charlton 
Copeland, Zanita Fenton, Adrian Barker Grant-Alfieri, Amelia Hope Grant-Alfieri, Ellen Grant, 
Patrick Gudridge, JoNel Newman, Bernie Perlmutter, Stephen Urice, Frank Valdes, Kele Williams, 
and the participants in Yale Law School's Conference on Frontiers in Social Justice Lawyer­
ing: Critical Race Revisited. 
I also wish to thank Robin Schard, Freddy Funes, Mia Goldhagen, Karen Shafrir, Kara 
Strochlic, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for their research assistance, as 
well as Cheryl Bratt and the editors of the Michigan law Review for their theory/practice commit­
ment. 
I .  See Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1 303 ( 1 947); Jerome Frank, 
Why Not a Clinical Wl>)'er-School?, 8 1  U. PA. L. REv. 907 ( 1 933). 
2. See THE MACCRATE REPORT (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg eds . •  1 994) ; 
TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. & THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR Ass' N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVE LOPMENT ( 1 992) .  More recently, see ROY STUCKEY ET AL. ,  BEST PRAC­
TICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). 
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bar. The results of this animus reinforce conventional roles and relationships 
among lawyers, clients, and communities; fortify the socioeconomic ine­
qualities of entrenched civil and criminal justice systems; and preserve the 
disparate treatment suffered by women and minorities in the legal services 
marketplace. Acquiescence to role convention and sociolegal inequality di­
minishes the curricular importance of professional development 
opportunities and programmatic social justice initiatives. Absent a meaning­
ful commitment to professional development and social justice in the law 
school curriculum, institutional mission succumbs to the reigning orthodox­
ies of the adversary system and the ethics of the legal marketplace. 3 
The theory/practice dichotomy in law school teaching, scholarship, and 
mission relegates clinical-lawyer instruction to the periphery of legal educa­
tion and consigns clinical faculty to a subordinate caste status differentiated 
by inferior compensation, limited governance, and segregated space.4 De­
spite this academic caste hierarchy, an increasing number of law schools 
have made progress in integrating clinical-lawyer perspectives into their 
pedagogies, scholarship, and curricular missions.5 Indeed, numerous schools 
at all tiers now embrace policy-oriented, problem-solving methods of peda­
gogy; recognize interdisciplinary, practice-based scholarship; and 
incorporate "lawyering" skills courses into the traditional core curriculum. 
Paradoxically, by carving pedagogies of practice out of positivist norms of 
neutrality and scientific technique, and individualist norms of liberal legal­
ism, law schools have fashioned a new formalism severed from difference­
based identity, context, and community. Pedagogies of practice common to 
both clinics and skills courses point to the rise of this new formalism in 
claims of neutral lawyer judgment, technical "lawyering" process values, 
and client-centered representation indifferent to the other-regarding interests 
of community building. 6 
3. See LANI GUINIER ET AL, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTI­
TUTIONAL CHANGE (1997); MILTON c. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL 
STREET LAWYER (2004); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal 
Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 5 1 5  (2007). 
4. See pp. 92-93. Broadly defined, clinical educators include instructors supervising in­
house clinics and extemships, or teaching "lawyering" skills simulation courses. Elliott S. Milstein, 
Clinical Legal Education in the United States: In-House Clinics, Extemships, and Simulations, 5 1  J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 375, 375-76 (2001) .  On disparities in clinical faculty compensation and governance, 
see CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUC., REPORT ON THE 2007-2008 SURVEY 3 1  (2008), 
available at http://www.csale.org/CSALE.07-08.Survey.Report.pdf (reporting on clinical faculty 
members' voting rights and ability to participate in law school committees); Taskforce on Clinicians 
& the Acad., Am. Ass'n of Law Sch. Section on Clinical Educ., Draft Statement of Fundamental 
Principles 2, 6, 8-10 (Apr. 30, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing unequal governance rights and 
inferior compensation and resources). The Draft Statement of Fundamental Principles cites the 
"caste system" perpetuated by the unequal status of clinical educators in law school institutional 
governance and "its stigmatizing impact" within the law school faculty. See Taskforce on Clinicians 
& the Acad., supra, at 9. 
5. Jill Schachner Chanen, Re-Engineering the JD: Schools Across the Country Are Teaching 
Less About the Law and More About lawyering, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 42; Jonathan D. Glater, 
Training Law Students for Real-Life Careers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3 1 ,  2007, at B9. 
6. In-house clinics attempt to resist this tendency by addressing client identity and commu­
nity in multidimensional contexts replete with emotional, narrative, spatial, and symbolic 
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This Review examines the theory/practice dichotomy in legal education 
through the prism of the Carnegie Foundation's7 Educating Lawyers: 
Preparation for the Profession of Law. Descriptively, it argues that the 
Foundation's investigation of law school curricular deficiencies in the areas 
of clinical-lawyer skills, professionalism, and public service overlooks the 
relevance of critical pedagogies in teaching students how to deal with differ­
ence-based identity and how to build cross-cultural community in diverse, 
multicultural practice settings differentiated by mutable and immutable 
characteristics such as class, gender, and race. Prescriptively, it argues that 
the Foundation's remedial call for the curricular integration of clinical­
lawyer practices similarly overlooks the utility of critical pedagogies in 
teaching students not only how to understand difference, but also how to 
represent difference-based clients and communities here and abroad. 
The Review is divided into two parts. Part I explores the Carnegie Foun­
dation's assessment of law schools in preparing students through 
contemporary case dialogue and in integrating alternative-practice pedago­
gies. Part II analyzes the ramifications of the Foundation's report for the 
application of alternative curricular frameworks, particularly critical peda­
gogies grounded in difference-based identity and community. These 
frameworks are briefly sketched in a study of the West Coconut Grove His­
toric Black Church project at the University of Miami Law School's 
Community Economic Development and Design ("CEDAD") Clinic. The 
case study demonstrates both the difficulty and the necessity of developing 
theory/practice pedagogies effective in dealing with difference-based iden­
tity in the context of representing communities of color. 
I .  (M1s)EDUCATING LAWYERS: THE CARNEGIE 
FOUNDATION CRITIQUE 
The Carnegie Foundation's critique offers an abridged cultural and so­
cial history of legal education predicated on the vision of law as a "public 
profession" and of lawyers as agents charged with "important public re­
sponsibilities" (p. 1) .  The critique gleans this sociocultural history from a 
cross-section of sixteen law schools of varying tiers surveyed during the 
1999-2000 academic year. The Foundation views the preparation of lawyers 
in law school as "the crucial portal to the practice of law" (p. 1 ), illuminat­
ing "the daily practices of teaching and learning through which future legal 
professionals are formed" (pp. 1-2). 
To better understand legal education and its implications for the profes­
sion, the Foundation focuses on " how learning occurs" in law and in other 
professions such as medicine (pp. 2, 192-94). Focusing on how law school 
complexity. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing "Colored Town ", 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 829 (2007). 
7. William Sullivan is a Senior Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of 
Teaching; Anne Colby is Co-Director of The Carnegie Foundation's Preparation for the Professions 
Program; Judith Wegner is a Senior Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation; Lloyd Bond is a Senior 
Scholar at The Carnegie Foundation; Lee Schulman is President of The Carnegie Foundation. 
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"forms minds and shapes identities," it links the common aim of all profes­
sional education to the cultivation of specialized knowledge and 
professional identity (p. 2). Next it highlights the "modes of teaching and 
learning" that law schools use to accomplish that common aim (p. 3). Two 
modes of teaching and learning stand central to this analysis-the classroom 
experience of Socratic case dialogue8 and the clinical experience of lawyer 
apprenticeship.9 Both modes of pedagogy contribute to the development of 
legal understanding and the formation of professional identity. 10 Yet, both 
produce different and often inconsonant sets of legal skills and professional 
norms. That dissonance, echoed throughout the law school experience, chal­
lenges the Foundation to search the history of legal education for means of 
pedagogical reconciliation and curricular integration. 
A. The Evolution of Case-Dialogue Pedagogy 
The Carnegie Foundation traces the current dissonance in the profes­
sional enterprise of legal education to the evolution of the modern law 
school as a contested, hybrid institution (pp. 4-5, 78-82). This evolution 
displays a historic tension between the conventions of the practitioner com­
munity and the canons of the modern research university. From the 
practitioner community, law schools derive traditions of craft, judgment, and 
public responsibility. From the research university, law schools deduce ide­
als of knowledge, reason, and truth-academic ideals that emphasize 
objective, quantitative measurement and formal knowledge abstracted from 
the daily context of practice (p. 5). Akin to philosophical positivism, this 
widely adopted academic epistemology heralds the value of importing "sci­
entifically generated" forms of knowledge as "technical instruments for 
managing events in more rational ways" (p. 5). Legal positivists grasp "law 
as an instrument of rational policymaking-a set of rules and techniques 
rather than a craft of interpretation and adaptation embedded in the common 
law" (p. 5). This institutional seizure of scientific methodology and techni­
cal rationality, the Foundation shows, "undermined the academic legitimacy 
of practical knowledge" in legal education (p. 5). 
To the Carnegie Foundation, the waning legitimacy of practical knowl­
edge under positivist legal theory stemmed from a failure to blend academic 
8. On the reformist backdrop of the case-dialogue method, see Bruce A. Kimball, Young 
Christopher Langdell, 1826-1854: The Formation of an Educational Reformer, 52 J. LEGAL Eouc. 
1 89 (2002). See also David D. Gamer, The Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty­
First Century, 2000 BYU Eouc. & L.J. 307. 
9. On the curricular adaptations of the apprentice system, see James E. Moliterno, An 
Analysis of £1hics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Los/ Benefi1s of the Apprenlice System in The 
Academic Atmosphere. 60 U. CiN. L. REV. 83 ( 199 1 ). 
10. The Carnegie Foundation observes: "Professional schools are not only where expen 
knowledge and judgment are communicated from advanced practitioner to beginner; they are also 
the place where the profession puts its defining values and exemplars on display, where future prac­
titioners can begin both to assume and critically examine their future identities." P. 4. 
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and practitioner traditions of legal training in "reciprocal enrichment."1 1  That 
failure breached the legal profession's "contract with society" (p. 21) .  Re­
pairing this breach and restoring public trust requires academic/practitioner 
goal integration, a reappraisal of signature pedagogies, and a recovery of 
professionalism (pp. 2 1-33). For the Foundation, the opportunity to trans­
form legal education springs from the potential union of innovative practice 
pedagogies, professional norms, and case-dialogue traditions (pp. 33-43). 
The predominance of case-dialogue pedagogy in law schools signals the 
triumph of formal knowledge and scientific rationality in legal analysis (pp. 
5-7). Marked by the ascendance of university-housed academic specialists, 1 2 
the rise of an abstract jurisprudence of "general ideas and principles" in 
American law produced a new legal scholarship of doctrinal synthesis and a 
new method of training in legal knowledge "separate from learning to prac­
tice" (pp. 5-6). The new scholarship assimilated the model of formal, 
scientific discourse, engrafting it on constitutional, statutory, and common 
law materials (pp. 5-7). Assimilation resulted in the shifting of academic 
research norms away from practice contexts toward an emulation of the arts­
and-sciences disciplines (pp. 1 1 - 1 2).  The new methodology likewise favored 
legal knowledge and reasoning over practice skills/3 deferring practice ex­
perience until postgraduate entry into the profession . 14 Preference for formal 
knowledge and objectivity helped rationalize the legal process, the Founda­
tion concedes, but worked to diminish the relationship of legal education to 
morality and public responsibility (p. 7). The consequent "loss of orientation 
and meaning" among faculty and students reveals the "shadow side" of 
modern legal education and fuels recurrent accusations of professional self­
absorption and public irresponsibility (p. 7). 
For the Carnegie Foundation, case dialogue symbolizes legal education's 
signature pedagogy. 15 The reliance of the case-dialogue method on the in­
class tactics and dynamics of the Socratic process furnishes students cogni­
tive instruction in the realist task of fitting rules to contextually unmoored 
facts. 16 According to the Foundation, the Socratic process affords flexibility 
1 1 . P. 5; see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and 
the Legal Profession, 9 1  MICH. L. REV. 34 ( 1 992). 
1 2. See John S. Elson, Why and How the Practicing Bar Must Rescue American Legal Edu­
cation from the Misguided Priorities of American Legal Academia, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1 1 35, 1 1 35-
36, 1 1 38-39 ( 1 997); Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the 
Research University and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 Omo ST. L.J. 1 965, 
1 968-78 ( 1 999). 
1 3. See generally ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO 
"THINK LIKE A LAWYER" (2007). 
1 4. The need to teach new associates law-office management exemplifies such misplaced 
deferment. See Debra Moss Curtis, Teaching Law Office Management: Why Law Studellls Need to 
Know the Business of Being a Lawyer, 7 1  ALB. L. REv. 201 (2008). 
1 5. Pp. 47-50; see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell 's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. I 
( 1 983); Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell 's Method, and What to Do About it, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 609 (2007). 
1 6. See Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal Realist 
Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REv. 483, 494-508 (2007). 
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in adjusting case dialogue and exposes indeterminacy in the application of 
rules (pp. 47-50). To a more limited extent, it also expands the interpretative 
and policy repertoire of students. Nonetheless, the Foundation contends that 
the case-dialogue method generates diminishing returns, particularly when 
extended beyond the first-year classroom. 17 This decline in pedagogical effi­
cacy18 is not seen elsewhere in professional education, for example in 
medical school, where a continuum of theory/practice integration holds cur­
ricular sway. 19 To correct the curricular overreliance on case-dialogue 
methods in law school, and to counter the ethical relativism and nihilism 
that may ensue,20 the Foundation considers alternative methods of practice­
based instruction that enhance the formative, identity-making dimension of 
legal education. 
B. The Tum to Practice: Clinical Programs and 
"Lawyering " Courses 
The Foundation's turn toward practice integration borrows from appren­
tice traditions and the cognitive sciences. Earlier invoked in the MacCrate 
report, apprentice traditions help to overcome the trade school stigma often 
associated with practice pedagogies.21 Bolstered by advances in the cogni­
tive study of learning, 22 the traditions now give greater meaning to the 
formation of professional expertise (pp. 95-100). The apprentice model of 
practice supplies cognitive techniques and operating procedures to enrich 
legal knowledge and professional effectiveness. Those techniques include 
case and composition theory, legal writing, skill simulation, and negotiation 
(pp. 102-13) .  Case theory in particular affords students an opportunity to 
move from novice experimentation to expert practice and, ultimately, to 
17 .  Pp. 75-78;  see also Mitu Gulati et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination 
of the Third Year of Law School, 5 1  J. LEGAL Eouc. 235 (200 I). 
18. For empirical research on pedagogical efficacy, see Stefan H. Krieger, The Development 
of Legal Reasoning Skills in Law Students: An Empirical Study, 56 J. LEGAL Eouc. 332 (2006). 
19. Pp. 59-84; see also Andrew J. Rothman, Preparing Law School Graduates for Practice: 
A Blueprint for Professional Education Following the Medical Profession Example, 5 1  RUTGERS L. 
REV. 875 ( 1 999); cf Molly Cook et al., American Medical Education JOO Years after the Flexner 
Report, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 339 (2006). 
20. On ethical relativism and nihilism in legal education, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Denatural-
izing the Lawyer-Statesman, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 204 ( 1 995) (book review). 
2 1 .  Pp. 91-93. For sympathetic accounts of the MacCrate report, see Russell Engler, The 
MacCrate Report Ttlms JO: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 
CLINICAL L. REV. 1 09 (200 1 ), and Peter A. Joy, The MacCrate Report: Moving Toward Integrated 
Leaming Experiences, I CLINICAL L. REV. 401 ( 1994). 
22. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and 
the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3 1 3, 329-32 ( 1995); Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Law­
yers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL Eouc. 57, 60 ( 1992). 
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formal knowledge. This process fosters the exercise of judgment in context 
and builds professional identity and purpose.23 
To surmount the positivist ethos of the research university, the Founda­
tion recommends practice pedagogies that unite the disparate parts of legal 
education by reconnecting craft with formal knowledge. It locates this unity 
in an alternative conception of craft-informed knowledge animating the 
work of engaged practitioners in clinical, "lawyering" skills, and legal writ­
ing courses. For this practitioner community, "law is a tradition of social 
practice that includes particular habits of mind, as well as a distinctive ethi­
cal engagement with the world" (p. 8). Understanding law as a practice 
tradition tied to cognitive development, skill, and social interaction redefines 
legal education as a practical discipline. To the Foundation, "the practical 
disciplines embody forms of knowing that blur distinctions among cogni­
tion, action, and intention" (p. 8). Learning to apply these forms of knowing 
requires the teaching of practical judgment. 
The Carnegie Foundation defines practical judgment in terms of "the 
ability to both act and think well in uncertain situations" (p. 9). On this 
definition, judgment is in part a function of professional expertise. The skill­
ful application of professional judgment "means involvement in situations 
that are necessarily indeterminate from the point of view of formal knowl­
edge" (p. 8). The Foundation explicitly aims to enhance professional 
judgment through critical analysis. This craft-guided critical analysis treats 
professional practice as an instance of "judgment in action" (p. 9). In order 
"to make practice more effective, comprehensible to students, and open to 
critical assessment" (p. 9), the Foundation notes, analysis demands reflec­
tion. 
Clinical education satisfies this demand by providing contexts in which 
students "observe, simulate, attempt, and then critically reflect on their 
work" (p. 9). The clinical case conference and practicum employed in the 
CEDAD Clinic's Historic Black Church project, for example, provide con­
texts in which students assess community-based practice situations, 
critically reflect on church-client and community needs, and reach collabo­
rative judgments about remedial legal, political, and social solutions. 
Indeed, the clinical pedagogy of participatory analysis, critique, and reflec­
tion enables CEDAD students to broaden their perception of faith-based 
racial identity and deepen their appreciation for black church ministries and 
congregations, thus enlarging their professional repertoires of experience 
and judgment. Experiential learning of this sort revives the normative pur­
poses of the profession (p. 10). 
The Carnegie Foundation's endorsement of the application of theoretical 
work to the domain of practice generates alternative pedagogies and analytic 
frameworks culled from the interpretation of client and community contexts 
and case narratives. Unsurprisingly, the narratives reveal "much more being 
23. See pp. 1 1 1 -25. The Foundation argues that "case theory calls attention to the important 
role played by the problems of particular clients in specific situations in giving impetus to the legal 
process." P. 1 24. 
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taught and learned in any pedagogical situation than can be consciously ab­
stracted in the form of procedures or techniques" (p. 1 1 ) .  The lessons of 
client and community narrative carry moral consequences for legal relation­
ships, political alliances, and social activities, faith-based and otherwise.24 A 
decisive dimension of a lawyer's multiple roles and relationships "is respon­
sibility for clients and for the values the public has entrusted to the 
profession" (p. 12). Basic to legal knowledge, that responsibility drives the 
increased curricular integration of "lawyering" skills courses.25 
C. Professional Reformation 
The Carnegie Foundation's integrated model of legal education com­
bines "conceptual knowledge, skill, and moral discernment" with the 
capacity for situated judgment (p. 12). Bridging the gap between analytical 
and practical knowledge and revitalizing professional integrity hinge on ( 1 )  
extending the field of legal knowledge and (2) honing the moral capacity for 
good judgment acquired by students in clinical settings,26 such as the 
CEDAD Clinic's Historic Black Church project. The mutual enlargement of 
theoretical and practical legal knowledge, the Foundation maintains, "will 
progress best when it is directed by a focus on the professional formation of 
law students" (p. 13). 
1 .  Curricular Integration 
The Carnegie Foundation's vision of integrity-promoting purposive edu­
cation rests on the curricular integration of legal analysis, practical skill, and 
professional identity (pp. 19 1-202). Legal analysis, the Foundation ob­
serves, serves as "the prior condition for practice because it supplies the 
essential background assumptions and rules for engaging with the world 
through the medium of the law" (p. 1 3). Practical-skills training requires 
introduction to the cognitive perspective of practice and, moreover, immer­
sion in the development of advocacy and counseling methods. 27 Professional 
identity28 uses professionalism, social responsibility, and ethics as the cata­
lysts for an integrated legal education. To merge legal analysis and practical 
24. On the normative lessons of narrative, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty 
Law Practice: Leaming Lessons of Client Narrative, IOO YALE L.J. 2 1 07 ( 199 1 ). See generally 
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 1 1 0-42 (2000). 
25. Pp. 1 1- 12. The Carnegie Foundation defines "lawyering" courses to include legal writing 
instruction, simulated practicums, and in-house clinics. P. 17 .  See generally Arturo Lopez Torres, 
MacCrate Goes to Law School: An Annotated Bibliography of Methods for Teaching Lawyering 
Skills in the Classroom, 77 NEB. L. REV. 132 ( 1 998). 
26. See p. 1 3. 
27. The practical skill of intervention in advising and counseling clients grows through mod­
eling, habituation, experiment, and reflection. Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate 
pedagogies blending formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interaction. 
28. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Developmelll of 
Professional /delllity, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 555 (2007). 
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skills in a significant way, the Foundation insists, "professionalism needs to 
become more explicit and better diffused throughout legal preparation."29 
The Carnegie Foundation's framework for a more integrated approach to 
legal education recognizes that reliance on law school case-dialogue peda­
gogy for the purposes of professional socialization produces adverse, 
unintended consequences (pp. 1 85-88). Chief among those consequences is 
the neglect of practical judgment, lawyering skill, and professional identity. 
To mitigate such widespread neglect, the Foundation proposes comprehen­
sive change to the first-year and upper-level curricula.Jo Borrowing from 
business and medical school education, it urges continuity and innovation in 
case-teaching methodology in the classroom and in the field (pp. 197-200). 
Innovation requires not only leadership and vision, but also learning-based 
assessment procedures appropriate to case pedagogies.J 1  By design, assess­
ment procedures measure both conceptual knowledge and competence. 
Measures of conceptual knowledge rest on traditional standards of evalua­
tion inside the classroom. Measures of competence, by contrast, require 
alternative criterion-referenced appraisals of "lawyering" skills and ethical­
social development outside the classroom (pp. 164-80). The appraisal of 
classroom and fieldwork performance, the Foundation points out, depends 
on an institutional climate of reform and intentionality (pp. 1 80-84). 
2. Professional Identity and Purpose 
To the Carnegie Foundation, "the formation of competent and commit­
ted professionals deserves and needs to be the common, unifying purpose" 
of legal education (p. 1 3). This mission gives "renewed prominence to the 
ideals and commitments that have historically defined the legal profession in 
America" (p. 1 3). Renewing the ideals and commitments of the profession 
depends on communication and reciprocal learning among faculty and stu­
dents through curricular reorganization and innovative pedagogy. 
Reorganization moves legal ethics and professionalism to the center of the 
29. P. 1 4; see also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Teaching a Professional Responsibility Course: 
Lessons Learned from the Clinic, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 1 49, 1 52-54 (2002) (describing a situation 
where professionalism would have resolved a clinic dispute). 
30. Pp. 1 94-200; see also Michael A. Millemann & Steven D. Schwinn, Teaching legal 
Research and Writing with Actual Legal Work: Extending Clinical Education into the First Year, 1 2  
CLINICAL L .  REV. 44 1 ,  476-99 (2006); Margaret M. Russell, Beginner's Resolve: A n  Essay on Col­
laboration, Clinical Innovation, and the First-Year Core Curriculum, I CLINICAL L. REv. 1 35, 1 47-
56 ( 1994). 
3 1 .  Pp. 1 88-92; see E. Tammy Kim, Who 's Leaming What? Toward a participatory legal 
pedagogy, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 633, 635-37 (2008) (arguing that proper leadership from 
students, faculty, and law school administration may help the enterprise of legal education "move 
one step closer to ensuring that the legal profession represents and responds to the needs of the 
entire citizenry"); Clifford S. Zimmerman, "Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation ": Reflections 
on Collaborative and Cooperative Leaming Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 3 1  Aruz. ST. 
L.J. 957, 97 1-86 ( 1 999). Zimmerman expresses "concern about the framework for evaluation of 
teaching methods." Id. at 97 1 .  
1 082 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 1 07: 1073 
curriculum.32 Innovation incorporates ethics and professionalism instruction 
throughout the curriculum. 
Research on education and moral development underscores the impor­
tance of the pervasive method of legal ethics instruction.33 That method 
treats legal professionalism as an ideal, a practice, and a means of social 
contribution. An ethically sensitive apprenticeship model correlates profes­
sional identity with the public value of "doing justice."34 When ethical-social 
values pervade the apprenticeship process, professional identity and purpose 
gain a greater sense of responsibility, seen for example in the expanding 
commitment of the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove where 
attendance at evening church meetings and Sunday services has become 
routine. Enhanced responsibility augments the presence of moral-legal dia­
logue in law school and the potential for pro bono work, demonstrated for 
example in the cooperative development of a lawyer referral network jointly 
administered by the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove and 
black lawyers volunteering under the auspices of Miami's Wilkie D. Fergu­
son Jr. Bar Association. 
Pervasive professional responsibility dialogue links the "lawyering" 
roles of advocacy and service. It also unifies the cognitive, practical, and 
ethical-social dimensions of the apprenticeship process around the focal 
point of competence.35 That process installs a continuum of teaching, learn­
ing, and modeling positive professional ideals across first-year and upper­
level experiences.  Engaging professional ideals in core courses, "lawyering" 
practicums, and legal clinics demonstrates the possibility of purposive legal 
education (pp. 145-6 1).  
II .  (RE)EDUCATING LAWYERS: ALTERNATIVE 
THEORY/PRACTICE PEDAGOGIES 
The Carnegie Foundation's model of educational reform falters in 
slighting the integration of critical pedagogies in formal legal analysis, 
practical-skills training, and professional-identity building. Descriptively 
the model overlooks alternative theoretical frameworks and practice peda­
gogies acknowledging difference-based identity, context, and community. 
Prescriptively the model omits remedial strategies aimed at integrating 
32. See Russell G. Pearce, Teachi11g Legal Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most lmpor­
ta/l/ Subject i11 law School, 29 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 7 1 9, 735-39 ( 1 998); Deborah L. Rhode, Teachi11g 
Legal Ethics, 5 1  ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1043, 105 1-57 (2007). 
33. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3 1 ,  50-56 
( 1 992); Alan M. Weinberger, Some Further Observations on Usi11g the Pervasive Method of Teach­
ing Ethics in Property Courses, 5 1  ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 203 (2007). 
34. See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How law School Disappoims law Students, the 
Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 2 1 9, 248-55 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal 
Education: Professional Interests and Public Values, 34 IND. L. REV. 23, 38-45 (2000). 
35. See Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, law Schools and the Constructio11 of Compe­
tence, 43 J. LEGAL Eouc. 469 ( 1 993) (pointing out that law schools "construct competence" and 
change notions of competence). 
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difference-based identity, context, and community into law school peda­
gogy inside and outside the classroom. Reforming law school and 
reeducating the legal profession require a fuller description of the role of 
identity and community in "lawyering" and a bolder prescription for their 
pedagogical and practical integration. Many of these pedagogies are embed­
ded in clinical education and legal education more generally yet remain 
isolated and segregated from the broader curriculum. Exhibited in clinical 
and hybrid outreach programs to minority racial groups and subordinate 
cultures, the pedagogies demand alternative academic and experiential train­
ing regimens for students emphasizing civic leadership.36 
A. Critical Pedagogies in Legal Education 
Critical pedagogies extend the modem traditions of liberal legalism, par­
ticularly their condemnation of ascribed caste or status hierarchies, and 
embrace the postmod�rn contingencies of racial and cultural identity. Affirma­
tion links liberal legalism and postmodern contingency in a shared 
commitment to difference-based identity and antisubordination practice 
norms. These norms guide interdisciplinary, community-based collaborations 
employed in representing historically stigmatized groups encountered in 
Miami's West Coconut Grove and elsewhere. The Carnegie Foundation ig­
nores such alternative norms and their critical frameworks. 
The Foundation's disregard of alternative norms and frameworks in for­
mulating its model of educational reform inhibits the comprehensive 
transformation of practice pedagogies tied to legal analysis, "lawyering" 
skills, and professional identity. Pedagogical transformation requires closer 
attention to identity, context, and community in everyday practice, espe­
cially in dealing with minority racial groups and subordinate cultures. 
Critical pedagogies prove useful to representing historically stigmatized 
groups not only in condemning ascribed caste or status hierarchies, but also 
in understanding the complexity of racial and cultural identity, especially 
faith-based identity in individual, group, and institutional settings. Both lib­
eral legalism and postmodern contingency aid this revision by challenging 
neutral pedagogical perspectives and engendering practical cross-cultural 
collaborations.  
A transformative commitment to difference-based identity and antisub­
ordination practice norms commands the abandonment of neutrality claims 
in rendering lawyer judgments about the means and ends of representation.37 
The Carnegie Foundation's stance of neutrality, entrenched in the MacCrate 
36. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL Eouc. 596 (2006) (urging 
law school graduates to aspire to be leaders as well as counselors); Donald J. Polden, Educating 
Law St11delllsfor Leadership Roles and Responsibilities, 39 U. ToL. L. REV. 353 (2008) (same). 
37. The stance of neutrality combines elements of scientific rationality and doctrinal analy­
sis. See Barry Friedman, Nelltral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 ( 1 997); Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Ne11tral Principles ofC011stitutio11al Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I ,  10-20 ( 1 959). 
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report,38 tolerates the use of stereotype and stigma in the "lawyering" proc­
ess. Difference-based stereotype and stigma based on race, gender, or 
sexuality deforms the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral content of advo­
cacy. The classically liberal purpose of client-centered "lawyering" fails to 
cure stereotypes of client or group difference.39 Without cross-cultural and 
difference-based identity analysis, client-centered methods perpetuate 
stigma-induced marginalization in law and society. Suffused in neutrality, 
these methods seldom call for the contextual reassessment of client and 
community identity. However, only that reassessment will alter lawyer per­
ception and interpretation of client difference, and facilitate lawyer-client as 
well as lawyer-community interaction across differences.40 Reassessment 
entails lawyer introspection, cultural self-awareness, and cross-cultural 
skills. 41 
Client-collaborative reassessment confronts stereotypes that impute 
marginalizing traits or behaviors to communities of color inside and outside 
their church congregations.42 Confronting stereotypes through cross-cultural 
collaboration involves the identification of segregating differences, the ex­
ploration of multiple explanations for client behavior, and the elimination or 
mitigation of lawyer bias.43 Although the depth of lawyer bias and the force 
of color-blind neutrality hinder such identification and explanation, collabo-
38. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What 's Miss­
ing from the MacCrate Repon-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. 
REv. 593, 593 ( 1 994) ("[The MacCrate Report] enacts a particular picture of the lawyer, as princi­
pally a litigator, a 'means-ends' thinker who maximizes an abstracted client's goals."); Bumele V. 
Powell, Somewhere Farther Down the Line: MacCrate 011 Multiculturalism and the Information 
Age, 69 WASH. L. REV. 637 ( 1994). 
39. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client­
Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006) (examining the history, development, 
and theory of the client-centered approach to lawyering); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story ls It, Any­
way ?-Guiding Students to Client-Centered Interviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 509 (2008). 
40. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: lessons From Cognitive Social Psy­
chology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1 24 1 ,  1266-8 l (2002); Ian Weinstein, Don 't Believe Everything You 
Think: Cognitive Bias in legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003). Blasi noted that 
"it is unlikely that . . .  [there will be] long-lasting or widespread reductions in prejudice, so long 
as we leave unchanged the institutional and social structures that facilitate the perpetuation of 
stereotypes and the resulting discrimination, unintended and otherwise." Blasi, supra, at 1 266. 
See also Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)lntended Mes­
sages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in legal Analysis and Language, 27 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. l ,  3 (2003) (asserting that law schools should teach students to recognize cultural bias because 
such bias could be based on "untruths, stereotyping, or a simple lack of respect for differences"). 
4 1 .  See Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural 
Self-Awareness, 1 1  CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005); see also David Dominguez, Beyond "Zero-Sum 
Games: Multiculturalism as Enriched Law Training for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 75, 178 
( 1 994) (promoting a "negotiable learning" model where students work closely to negotiate key 
decisions which provides opportunities "to reconcile divergent cultural interests, value judgments, 
and priorities"). 
42. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People From The Foomotes: The Missing Element in Client­
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 401-1 1 ( 1 997). 
43. See Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 
CLINICAL L. REv. 33, 64-67 (2001 ); Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across 
Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373 (2002). 
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ratively enlarging the scope of client participation in the "lawyering" proc­
ess through individual decision making and collective action transforms 
practical judgment.44 Further, it sometimes expands client and community 
problem solving beyond case-specific needs to encompass issue-focused, 
neighborhood-wide campaigns,45 thereby motivating broader affinity groups 
to participate in democracy-enforcing legal-political advocacy about com­
monly shared grievances such as crime, fair housing, and municipal equity.46 
B. Critical Pedagogies in the Classroom 
The Carnegie Foundation's neglect of critical norms and frameworks in 
designing its model of educational reform hampers the comprehensive trans­
formation of classroom pedagogies fastened to legal analysis, "lawyering" 
skills, and professional identity. To be inclusive and wide-ranging,47 
pedagogical transformation requires the classroom infusion of multiple 
identity narratives, layered contextual descriptions, and silenced commu­
nity histories .48 The contextual exploration of client narrative and 
community history in parsing stories of dominant/subordinate group com­
petition and sociocultural conflict emerges out of a mixture of classical 
liberal and critical-outsider j urisprudence coupled with interdisciplinary 
investigation.49 Liberal j urisprudence gives voice to authentic self­
elaboration, individual liberty, and collective equality. Critical jurispru­
dence reveals caste status, class subordination, and the stigmas of race, 
gender, and sexuality.50 Interdisciplinary investigation discloses ethno­
graphic, psychological, and sociological insight. 
Tailored to both clinical and nonclinical classrooms, mixed jurispruden­
tial and interdisciplinary pedagogies of practice illuminate the cognitive, 
affective, and normative elements of legal roles and relationships in guiding 
44. See Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 
427, 486-5 1 5  (2000); Ascanio Piomelli ,  The Democratic Roots of Collaborative lawyering, 1 2  
CLINICAL L .  REV. 541,  589-6 1 1  (2006). 
45. See Gerald P. L6pez, Keynote Address, Living and lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORD­
HAM L. REV. 204 1 ,  2049 (2005); Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around 
Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004). 
46. See Lucie White, "Democracy" in Development Practice: Essays on a Fugitive Theme, 
64 TENN. L. REV. 1073 ( 1 997). 
47. See Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 
LA RAZA L.J. 1 40 ( 1 995); Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices 
Helps All Students learn, 48 J. LEGAL Eouc. 402 ( 1 998). 
48. Compare DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLJENT­
CENTERED A PPROACH ( 1 99 1 ), with Jacobs, supra note 42, at 346 (observing that the client-lawyer 
models employed by clinical programs "fail to address . . .  the effects of race, class and, to a lesser 
extent, gender"). 
49. See Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A "Signature Pedagogy" for Clinical 
Education?, 1 4  CLINICAL L. REv. 1 95 (2007). 
50. See Russell G. Pearce, White lawyering: Rethinking Race, lawyer Identity, and Rule of 
law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 208 1 ,  2093-99 (2005); David B.  Wilkins, Essay, Identities and Roles: 
Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1 502 ( 1 998). 
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lawyer, client, and community decision-making.5 1  Built on learning the­
ory,52 those elements comprise intuition,53 empathy,54 and emotional 
intelligence.55 Each of these behavioral elements is relevant to practice and 
professionalism training in "lawyering" courses,56 simulations,57 extern­
ships,58 and university-wide, cross-disciplinary clinical settings.59 
Joining jurisprudential and interdisciplinary classroom pedagogies also 
elucidates the values and techniques of ethical discretion and moral decision 
making in the "lawyering" process.6() Among the historic black ministries of 
West Coconut Grove, the calls for moral education,61 theology,62 spiritual-
5 1 .  See generally THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A 
HEALING PROFESSION (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, 
"Johnny 's in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine ": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical 
Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339 (2000). 
52. See Robin A. Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaching Law Students Through Individual Learning 
Styles, 62 ALB. L. REV. 2 1 3  ( 1 998); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning 
Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37 ( 1 995). 
53. See Kandis Scott, Clinical Essay, Non-Analytical Thinking in Law Practice: Blinking in 
the Forest, 1 2  CLINICAL L. REv. 687 (2006). 
54. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students Lose Perspective: Clini­
cal Supervision and the Management of Empathy, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 35 (2002); Peter Margulies, 
Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 605 ( 1 999). 
55. See Ann Juergens, Practicing What We Teach: The Importance of Emotion and Commu­
nity Connection in Law Work and Law Teaching, 1 1  CLINICAL L. REV. 4 1 3  (2005); John E. 
Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal Education: Strengthening 
the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. ToL.  L. REV. 323 (2008). 
56. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
6 1 9, 623 (2008) ("Clinical and simulation work should guide students to think critically about the 
interplay of logic, psychology, and culture . . . .  "); Judith L. Maute, Lawyering in the 21st Century: 
A Capstone Course on the Law and Ethics of Lawyering, 5 1  ST. LoUis U. L.J. 1 29 1  (2007). 
57. See Karen Barton et al., Authentic Fictions: Simulation, Professionalism and Legal 
Learning, 1 4  CLINICAL L. REV. 143 (2007). 
58. See Mary Jo Eyster, Designing and Teaching the Large Externship Clinic, 5 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 347 ( 1 999); Carolyn R. Young & Barbara A. Blanco, What Students Don 't Know Will Hurt 
Them: A Frank View From The Field On How To Better Prepare Our Clinic and Extemship Stu­
dents, 14 CLINICAL L. REv. 1 05 (2007); see also Lisa G. Lerman, Professional and Ethical Issues in 
Legal Externships: Fostering Commitment to Public Service, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2295 ( 1 999). 
59. See Kathleen Coulbom Faller & Frank E. Vandervort, Interdisciplinary Clinical Teaching 
of Child Welfare Practice to Law and Social Work Students: When World Views Collide, 4 1  U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 1 2 1  (2007); Spencer Rand, Teaching Law Students to Practice Social Justice: An In­
terdisciplinary Search for Help Through Social Work's Empowerment Approach, 1 3  CLINICAL L. 
REV. 459 (2006); Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary 
Education in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 3 1 9  ( 1 999). 
60. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to 
Practice, 1 20 HARV. L. REV. 65, 1 19-22 (2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORD­
H A M  L. REV. 1 3 17 ,  1 320-33 (2006). Katya! maintains that there is a "need for law schools to start a 
moral conversation and to encourage students to practice law in an 'ethical' manner." Katyal, supra, 
at 1 2 1 .  
6 1 .  See Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 CLINICAL 
L. REV. I ( 1 997); Thomas Shaffer, Legal Essay, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 1 8  ST. MARY'S 
L.J. 195 ( 1 986). 
62. See Melissa Harrison, Searching for Context: A Critique of Legal Education by Com­
parison to Theological Education, 1 1  Tux. J. WOMEN & L. 245 (2002). 
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ity,63 and religion64 in "law" converge in a moral conversation about "lawyer­
ing."65 The Carnegie Foundation implicitly invites this conversation by 
promoting a vision of civic professionalism inspired by renewed public re­
sponsibility. 66 That vision hinges on the capacity for reflective moral 
judgment acquired from ethical, legal, and social skills, and applied in 
classrooms, clinics, and communities.67 Realizing the Foundation's vision of 
student ethical-social development and law school-community collaboration 
warrants new forms of theory/practice integration68 and outreach.69 
Critical forms of theory/practice pedagogy regularly emerge from client 
and community collaborations in clinical education, often in the field of 
civil rights and poverty law. Erected here, four critical frameworks stand out 
in affording pedagogical opportunities for curricular revision. 7° Fundamental 
to community-based clinical education, the frameworks view the law as a 
social and cultural practice and look skeptically upon legal judgments as 
descriptively incomplete. Moreover, the frameworks view legal reasoning as 
63. See Calvin G.C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in a Law 
School Clinic, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 241 ( 1999); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Integrating Spiritual 
Perspectives with the Law School Experience: An Essay and an Invitation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1 67 (2000). 
64. See Margaret E. Montoya, Introduction, Religious Rituals and LatCrit Theorizing, 1 9  
CHICANO-LATINO L .  REV. 4 1 7  ( 1 998); Russell G .  Pearce, Forward, The Religious Lawyering Move­
ment: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 705 ( 1 998); 
see also Amelia J. Uelmen, An Explicit Connection Between Faith and Justice in Catholic Legal 
Education: Why Rock the Boat?, 81  U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 921 (2004). 
65. See MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMAN­
ISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS ( 1 98 1 ); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 1 -
3 8  ( 1987). 
66. See Steven K. Berenson, Institutional Professionalismfor Lawyers: Realizing the Virtues 
of Civic Professionalism, 1 09 W. VA. L. REv. 67 (2006) (book review) (remarking that the Founda­
tion desires a resurgence of civic professionalism to challenge the dominance of technical 
professionalism). See generally Mary Ann Dantuono, A Citizen Lawyer's Moral, Religious, and 
Professional Responsibility for the Administration of Justice for the Poor, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1 383 ( 1998) (noting that religion can positively impact civic obligations). 
67. See Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths From 
Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 ( 1 994) (endorsing scholarly clinical projects that 
"would envision the clinical training student-advocates need in order to work effectively with 
[community] groups"); cf Linda F. Smith, Why Clinical Programs Should Embrace Civic Engage· 
ment, Service Leaming and Community Based Research, 1 0  CLINICAL L. REV. 723 (2004) 
(contending that law school clinics could benefit from the community service based learning move­
ment). 
68. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Story, Clinical Genesis in Miami, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1 137 
(2007). See generally Symposium, Race, Economic Justice, and Community lawyering in the New 
Century, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1 82 1  (2007) (discussing community lawyering and the changing mean­
ing of community). 
69. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 1 4  CLINICAL L. REv. 
355 (2008); Robert Greenwald, The Role of Community-Based Clinical Legal Education in Support­
ing Public Interest lawyering, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 569 (2007). 
70. For prior groundwork in the practical uses of critical theory under the frameworks of 
cultural studies, critical-outsider jurisprudence, pragmatism, and democratic theory, see Anthony V. 
Alfieri, Essay, (Un)Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 1 2 1  HARV. L. REv. 805 
(2008). 
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multivariable and open-ended, and cast the process of lawyering as deriving 
legitimacy through client participation. 
The critical view of law as a social and cultural practice arises out of 
cultural studies.7 1  Essential to the critical reflection of clinical practice,72 
cultural studies scholarship denotes "lawyering" as an interpretive practice 
applicable to multiple oral, written, and social texts in action. That interpre­
tive practice locates the social reality of difference-based client and 
community identity in the interwoven constructions of law, culture, and so­
ciety73 seen and heard for example within the congregations of the Historic 
Black Churches of West Coconut Grove. Situating client or group identity in 
law, culture, and society refutes neutral claims of a natural or necessary 
mode of construction in advocacy and politics. From this standpoint, neither 
the socioeconomic condition of the West Grove churches nor the socio-legal 
identity of their congregations is attributable to a natural or necessary racial 
order. In fact, both are constructed in the interpretive and material move­
ments of law, culture, and society often captured within the "lawyering" 74 process. 
The critical view of legal judgments as descriptively incomplete follows 
from the insights of cultural studies and additionally borrows from critical­
outsider jurisprudence in treating identity as multifaceted and unstable.75 
The constituent parts of critical-outsider jurisprudence-critical race theory, 
feminist theory, and queer theory-proffer identity as a shifting aggregation 
of multiple categories beyond stock accounts of race, gender, sexuality, or 
7 1 .  See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Introduction, Beyond legal Realism ?: Cultural 
Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 1 3  YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3 (200 1 )  
("[L]egal scholarship itself should . . .  more fully embrace cultural analysis and cultural studies."). 
72. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching law Stude11ts to Self-critique and to Develop Critical Clinical 
Self-aware11ess in Performance, 1 3  CLINICAL L. REV. 1 43 (2006); Anahid Gharakhanian, ABA Sta11-
dard 305's "Guided Reflections": A Perfect Fit for Guided Fieldwork, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 6 1  
(2007). See generally DONALD A .  SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS 
THINK IN ACTION ( 1 983) (exploring how nonlegal professionals solve problems based on reflection 
from practice); Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective legal Practitio11er, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 
23 1 ( 1 995). 
73. See Bill Ong Hing, Raisi11g Personal ldemificatio11 Issues of Class, Race, Eth11icity, 
Ge11der, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age i11 lawyeri11g Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
1 807 (1993). 
74. See ge11eral/y Margaret E. Johnson, An Experimelll in lmegrating Critical Theory and 
Clinical Educatio11, 1 3  AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 16 1  (2005); Ann Shalleck, Theory and 
Experience in Constructi11g the Relationship Between lawyer and Client: Represellling Women Who 
Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. I 0 1 9  ( 1 997). 
75. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Eth11icity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to latCrit The­
ory, 85 CAL L. REV. 1 143, 1 1 52 ( 1 997) ("[A]ll racial identities, not least those of Mexican 
Americans and Latinos/as more generally, are intelligible only as social constructions."); Imani 
Perry, Cultural Studies, Critical Race Theory and Some Reflections on Methods, 50 VILL. L. REV. 
9 1 5  (2005) (reflecting on "the usefulness of cultural studies to studies of race and the law"); Gerald 
Torres & Katie Pace, Understanding Patriarchy as an Expression of Whiteness: Insights from the 
Chicana Movement, 1 8  WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 1 29 (2005) (discussing how members of one ethnic 
group might identify themselves as part of another); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence. 
Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical legal Education, 
I O  ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003). 
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religious faith.76 Acknowledging the multiple dimensions and changing 
qualities of difference-based client and community identity renders "lawyer­
ing" judgments of fact and law incomplete and partial.77 Applied to the 
congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this view coun­
sels CEDAD's clinical students to proceed carefully in describing what they 
see and hear, and to advance slowly in reaching judgments of client motiva­
tion and purpose. 
The critical view of legal reasoning as multivariable and open-ended 
draws from outsider jurisprudence coupled with the realist caution of prag­
matism. 7s Critical pragmatism contextualizes lawyer advocacy judgments 
exposing legal reasoning as situational. 79 Entangled in the representation of 
difference-based client and community identity, those practical judgments 
produce highly contingent, provisional outcomes.so The critical impulse of 
pragmatism encourages revisiting the roles, relationships, and goals of client 
and community representation in order to test the validity of "lawyering" 
judgments in action.s 1  For CEDAD clinical students working in partnership 
with the congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this 
counterintuitive encouragement produces useful reflection and self-doubt 
about "lawyering" solutions, as well as ongoing experimentation in develop­
ing community-based, participatory remedies. 
The critical view of lawyering as legitimated through client participation 
comes out of democratic theory. sz Engrafted on difference-based identity 
76. See Kim Brooks & Debra Parkes, Queering Legal Education: A Project of Theoretical 
Discovery, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (2004); Carolyn Grose, A Field Trip to Benetton . . .  And 
Beyond: Some Thoughts on "Outsider Narrative" in a law School Clinic, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 109 
( 1997); see also, Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach Problem-Solving, 4 
CLINICAL L. REV. 65 ( 1997). 
77. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and 
Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901 ( 1 997); Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing 
Race from Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 5 1  (1 994). 
78. See generally Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism and Realism, 1 8  CARDOZO L. REV. 153 
( 1 996) (comparing realist caution of pragmatism). 
79. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1 597 (1 990); 
Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Commentary, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical 
Legal Practice, 1 39 U. PA. L. REV. 10 19  ( 1 991) ;  Daria Roithmayr, "'Easy for You to Say": An Essay 
on Outsiders, the Usefulness of Reason, and Radical Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (2003). 
80. See Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Leaming About Practical Judgment 
in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247 ( 1 998) (positing effective practical judgment as a means to 
discern differences in client and community identity); Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching 
Professiona/ Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527 ( 1994). 
8 1 .  See Alan M. Lerner, law & Lawyering in the Work Place: Building Better lawyers by 
Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REv. 
1 07 ( 1 999); Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 
623 (2003). 
82. See V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who 's Listening ? Introducing Students to Client· 
Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9 
CLINICAL L. REv. 83, 93-96 (2002) (linking improved advocacy results to client participation and 
empowerment). To address the breadth of community-wide economic, political, and legal chal· 
lenges, problem-solving pedagogies must reach beyond the scope of individual client representation. 
See Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in Prob· 
/em-Solving Beyond Individual Client-Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405 (2002). 
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and antisubordination practice norms, democratic legal theory encourages 
client participation in the "lawyering" process through community-based 
collaborations inside and outside of neighborhood church congregations. 
Facilitating client participation in the "lawyering" process educates clients 
in rights discourse, creating opportunities for individual empowerment and 
collective mobilization. 83 Empowerment and mobilization depend on educat­
ing clients in "lawyering" skills and training lay advocates to represent 
underserved groups and communities. 84 Civic engagement in fostering grass­
roots, democratic initiatives among clients and client groups helps transform 
the standard conception of the "lawyering" process as lawyer driven and 
professional identity as lawyer dominant. Joining the congregations of the 
West Grove's Historic B lack Churches in strategic planning about legal­
political rights education and social-service capacity-building breaks away 
from the standard conception of lawyer domination in community advocacy. 
C. Critical Pedagogies in Community Action: 
The Historic Black Church Project 
The Historic Black Church project is part of the University of Miami 
Law School's ongoing nine-year effort to assist Miami's economically dis­
tressed West Coconut Grove community. Housed at the School's Center for 
Ethics and Public Service, the project is spearheaded by the CEDAD Clinic, 
a joint venture collaboration with the University's School of Architecture 
and Florida Legal Services. The purpose of the project is to provide multid­
isciplinary resources in education, law, and social services to underserved 
low-income residents by establishing congregation-based church partner­
ships through the West Grove's sixteen-church Ministerial Alliance. 
Exemplifying critical pedagogies, the project combines poverty law instruc­
tion 85 and community-based skills training86 with student-centered ethical 
and social development strategies to advance racial justice. 87 
83. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESIST­
ING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002); Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could: 
Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 469; 
Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grass­
roots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001 ). 
84. Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social 
Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 250-54 (1999). 
85. See JoNel Newman, Essay, Re-Conceptualizing Poverty Law Clinical Curriculum and 
Legal Services Practice: The Need for Generalists, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 303, 1 3 1 8-24 (2007). 
See generally Marie A. Failinger, A Home of Its Own: The Role of Poverty Law in Furthering Law 
Schools' Missions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 1 73 (2007). 
86. See generally Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community 
Economic Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45 (2002) (discussing the diversity of skills 
learned in a community economic development clinic); Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building 
as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal 
Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REv. 445 (2002). 
87. See generally Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REv. 287 (2001);  
Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 FORDHAM L.  REv. 85 1 (2004 ) ;  Jon C. Dubin, 
April 2009] Against Practice 1 09 1  
The project entails several interrelated experiential learning m1tlatives 
encompassing rights-education seminars, capacity-building workshops, and 
oral history church archive compilations.88 The project's rights-education 
seminars address a wide range of topics affecting the West Grove's church 
congregations, including children's health, education, elder law, tenants' 
rights, homeowner protection, crime prevention, and voting rights.89 The 
church-based seminars afford both students and church activists the oppor­
tunity to learn substantive law while integrating critical pedagogies into 
classroom and community settings. Legal analysis of this kind supplies stu­
dents and activists with the constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal rules 
needed to engage with the world through the medium of the law. 
The project's capacity-building workshops, by comparison, focus on 
community-wide economic development and nonprofit legal compliance.90 
These church-based workshops offer practical-skills training in financial 
management and nonprofit governance spanning a variety of substantive 
areas from corporate to tax law. Learning to assist client groups and organi­
zations occurs through modeling, habituation, experiment, and reflection. 
Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate pedagogies blending 
formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interac­
tion.91 
In contrast, the project's ongoing assembly of oral history church ar­
chives,92 and the planned establishment of a national consortium on 
Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 5 1  SMU L. REV. 146 1  ( 1998); Stephen Wizner, The 
law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1929 (2002). 
88. See generally Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional 
law Curriculum Through Experiential Leaming, 5 1  J. LEGAL Enuc . 5 1  (2001 )  (describing the 
benefits of experiential learning programs); James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential 
Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 7 1  ( 1996) (same). 
89. The Center For Ethics and Public Service Forms an alliance with black churches in West 
Coconut Grove: Partners from the Pulpit, VERITAS, http://www6.miami.edu/veritas/summer2008/nb/ 
nb.html (last visited Nov. 2 1 ,  2008). 
90. See Project Description, Community Economic Development and Design Clinic, Historic 
Black Church Project (Fall 2008) (on file with author). 
9 1 .  See David A. B inder & Paul Bergman, Taking lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 1 0  
CLINICAL L .  REV. 1 9 1  (2003); Harriet N .  Katz, Evaluating the Skills Curriculum: Challenges and 
Opportunities for law Schools, 59 MERCER L. REV. 909 (2008); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Desegre­
gating the law School Curriculum: How to Integrate More of the Skills and Values Identified by the 
MacCrate Report Into a Doctrinal Course, 3 NEV. L.J. 32 (2002). 
92. The archives are compiled and stored at individual churches through a student-faculty 
partnership with local schools in Coconut Grove. The oral histories of each congregation and minis­
try are assembled and videotaped by high school, undergraduate, and law students. Both high school 
and undergraduate students also participate in faculty supervised multimedia projects (drawing, 
painting, and photography) documenting the churches in conjunction with their congregations and 
affiliated youth groups. See Project Description, supra note 90. Such multimedia projects offer 
partnership opportunities with university fine arts departments and law school legal writing pro­
grams. Cf Rebecca A. Cochran, Legal Research and Writing Programs as Vehicles for law Student 
Pro Bono Service, 8 B.U. Pus. INT. L.J. 429 (1999) (proposing to use legal research and writing 
programs as a means of engaging students in pro bono work). See generally Sarah O'Rourke Schrup, 
The Clinical Divide: Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration Between Clinics and Legal Writing 
Programs, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 301 (2007) (advocating increased communication between legal 
research and writing programs and clinical programs). 
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campus-church-community collaboration linking faith-inspired civic en­
gagement and service learning in higher education, work to invigorate 
professionalism norms of social responsibility, historical witness, and ethi­
cal reflection.93 By plan, critical pedagogies stress the public purpose of the 
profession. Fundamental to that purpose is the formation of professional 
identity guided by other-regarding interests.94 Viewed against the backdrop 
of the Historic Black Church project, both the formation and reformation of 
professional identity is underway. 
CONCLUSION 
Joint law school-community initiatives like CEDAD's Historic Black 
Church project enrich the mission of clinical education and legal education 
more generally by addressing difference-based identities, contexts, and 
communities through innovative theory/practice pedagogies. Both CEDAD 
and the Carnegie Foundation advance these pedagogies in the hope of en­
couraging "more informed scholarship and imaginative dialogue about 
teaching and learning for the law" and prodding legal educators to build "a 
stronger commitment to the public mission and purpose of the vocation and 
the institution they have chosen to serve" (p. 19). And yet, both the Founda­
tion and CEDAD falter when they overlook the relevance of critical 
pedagogies in teaching students how best to engage with difference-based 
identity in the context of representing communities of color. The traditions 
of civic professionalism help shape that engagement. The critical pedago­
gies arising out of the campus-community collaboration between CEDAD's 
clinical law students and the West Grove's Historic Black Church congrega­
tions help ground it in mutual faith. 
93. P. 1 4; see also Peter A. Joy, Essay, The law School Clinic as a Model Ethical law Of· 
fice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 35 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the law 
Office, 7 1  NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 ( 1 996). 
94. See Aoyd, supra note 28. 
